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Publicity is one of the newest rights of the twentieth century.' It gives a per-
son who has achieved celebrity status or fame the right to market this accom-
plishment by controlling and licensing the use of his or her image, likeness, or
name.
2
Publicity developed out of the right of privacy which was itself conceived in
the twentieth century.3 Specifically, as privacy developed, legal scholars and
some courts also identified and defined the existence of another related area of
protected interests.4 This related area was later called publicity, and a debate
began as to whether publicity constituted a totally separate right from that of
privacy.'
Throughout its short history, the development of publicity, as a right and as a
concept, has been intertwined with the development of privacy rights.6 Conse-
quently, publicity has alternately been treated as a legitimate offspring of priva-
cy, or as a problematic stepchild.7 In far too many cases, however, publicity has
not been accorded the full independence that its economic worth so demands.8
In some states, the owner of the publicity right has limited power to exercise the
right or to prohibit its unauthorized use by others.9 In other states, the celebrity
* Assistant Professor of Business Law, Fogelman School of Business, University of Memphis;
B.A. 1971, Vanderbilt University; M.A. 1974, University of Memphis; J.D. 1976, Washington Uni-
versity.
1. See State ex rel. Elvis Presley Int'l Memorial Found. v. Crowell, 733 S.W.2d 89, 94 (Tenn.
Co. App. 1987) [hereinafter "Crowell"].
2. Id.
3. Id. One commentator explained that publicity was "carved out of the general right of privacy.
like Eve from Adam's rib.' J. Thomas McCarthy, The Rights of Publicity and Privacy, 203 (19-
92).
4. Crowell, 733 S.W.2d at 94.
5. Id.
6. Richard E. Pikes, The Right of Publicity: a descendible and inheritable property right, 14
CUMB. L. REV. 347 (1984). Barbara Singer, The Right of Publicity: Star Vehicle or Shooting Star? 10
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. LJ. 365 (1992).
7. Fikes, supra note 6, at 351-2.
8. Sheldon W. Halpem, The Right of Publicity: Commercial Exploitation of the Associative
Value of Personality, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1199, 1200 (1986). See also Seth E. Bloom, Preventing the
Misappropriation of Identity: Beyond the "Right of Publicity", 13 HASTNGS COMM. & ENT. LJ. 489
(1991); Kathleen Birkel Dangelo, How Much of You do You Really Own? A Property Right in Identi-
ty, 37 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 499 (1989); J. Eugene Salomon, Jr., The Right of Publicity Run Riot: The
Case for a Federal Statute, 60 S. CAL. L. REv. 1179 (1987).
9. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. L. ch. 214, § 3A (limiting the right of publicity); UTAH CODE ANN.
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has a right to publicity, but the right is personal and therefore not descendible to
the celebrity's estate.'"
Several states, either by statute or by common law, have recognized that the
right of publicity exists, that it is property, and that it is subject to the same rules
of transfer and descent as other property." A few other states severely limit the
right of publicity, holding it to be little more than a part of the privacy right and
therefore a personal right which terminates at death.' Finally, some states have
not recognized the existence of a publicity right. 3
This article looks at some of the problems caused by the confusing state of
publicity law and suggests possible federal legislation which would, at a mini-
mum, recognize the existence of a right of publicity and treat it as any other
intellectual property. While this author is against the trend toward proposing a
federal law for every conceivable problem, the right of publicity is a classic
example of a valid interstate commerce concern worthy of unitary federal protec-
tion.
Today's modem media has made it possible for a person, such as Elvis Pres-
ley or Michael Jackson, to have his name, face, and personal mannerisms known
and recognized in literally every hamlet or hut in the world. The good will con-
nected with this recognition can generate customers willing to buy an item just
because such a celebrity's picture or name is on it.'4 Without a right to control
the commercial use of personal images, items with a celebrity's name or likeness
can be sold at any time, by any person, anywhere in the nation without the per-
mission of the celebrity, or the celebrity's estate. In states where there is a very
limited right of publicity, the celebrity or his estate could be barred in some
instances from exercising control over the use of the celebrity's image.'5 Thus,
the celebrity can be prevented from claiming any part of the profit made by a
stranger who contributed nothing to the creation of the image and who is not an
heir or assign to the image. 6
In the modem world, celebrity images originate in one state, such as Tennes-
see, California or New York, and then are transmitted to all the others via mov-
ies, television, radio, records, or video tapes. It is this interstate broadcast of
celebrity images that make publicity rights a reasonable candidate for nationwide
legislation.
§ 45-3 (1953) (limiting the right of publicity).
10. See, e.g., Sinker v. Goldsmith, 623 F. Supp. 727 (D. Ariz. 1985).
11. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-25-1101 to 47-25-1108; CAL. CIv. CODE § 990(b), (c),
(1h); See also Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905).
12. Frederick Kessler, A Common Law for the Statutory Era: The Right of Publicity and New
York's Right of Privacy Statute, 15 FoRDHAM URB. LJ. 951, 956 (1987).
13. 1& See appendix A & B for a current comparison of state publicity and privacy law.
14. Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity Rights,
81 CAL. L. REv. 127, 128 (1993).
15. Note that in New York, under the state privacy statute there is only limited protection of pub-
licity rights.
16. Halpern, supra note 8, at 1236.
17. Leslie Kane, Posthumous Right of Publicity: Jurisdictional Conflict and a Proposal for Solu-
[Vol. V: I
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In this sense, publicity, like an invention, an artistic creation, or computer
software, is an expression of intangible property that can easily be transferred,
duplicated, or utilized by others. Generally, intangible property with such charac-
teristics are protected by federal patent and copyright statutes." In making the
case for federal legislation, this article analyzes the current regulation of publici-
ty with an emphasis on the difficulties that states have had in distinguishing
publicity from privacy. Section I will examine the development of the right of
privacy and the birth of the right of publicity. Section II will trace the develop-
ment of publicity through the courts and legislatures of four representative states
which have a major interest in such a right: New York, with Broadway actors,
artists, writers, and other celebrities; California, with Hollywood and movie stars;
Tennessee, with music stars and Elvis, who is certainly the "king" of publicity
rights lawsuits; and Georgia, whose recognition of common law rights of both
privacy and publicity, may be viewed as a model for other states that have not
yet confronted either issue. Finally, this article concludes with a proposal for a
Model Publicity Statute.
I. FROM PRiVACY TO PUBLICIrY
A. THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY
The right of privacy is a concept that has matured with the modem industrial
state.9 Its birth in America did not arise out of litigation but, rather, arose from
an 1890 law review article by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis.20 Warren
and Brandeis derived the concept of a right of privacy from the English case,
Albert v. Strange.2' They borrowed the term "privacy" to describe their concern
with media's intrusion into the affairs of private citizens.' Essentially, the arti-
cle defended the individual's "right to be let alone." '
tion, 24 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 111, 133 (1989).
18. See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq.; Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. § 101 et
seq. (1995); Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq.
19. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
Dean Prosser has suggested that Warren may have been inspired to expand the right of privacy be-
cause of the press' excessive prying into his private affairs. William Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L.
REV. 383, 423 (1960).
20. Prosser, supra note 19 at 383.
21. 1 McN. & G. 23.43 (1849). In Strange, Prince Albert sued to prevent the defendants from
publishing copies or descriptions of etchings which he and Queen Victoria had drawn for their own
entertainment. In ruling for the plaintiff, the presiding judge, Lord Cottenham, used the term "pri-
vacy" in determining the right being invaded. One wonders how far this right would have progressed
had a matter arose not involving the "king" and queen of England.
22. The private citizen in this case was Warren's wife, a wealthy Boston socialite. Her fashion-
able parties were covered in salacious fashion by the Boston papers. To battle this outrage, Warren
joined with his former law partner and Harvard law classmate, Brandeis, to voice a personal protest
against what they considered to be a new means of intruding into the life of a citizen and informing
the whole community of even minute and insignificant private activities. See MASON & Louis D.
BRANDEIs, A FREE MAN's LiFE (1946).
23. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 19, at 193; see also Halpern, supra note 8.
1995]
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Warren and Brandeis saw the right of privacy as a natural development, evol-
ving as a logical application of common law principles to new developments. "4
They concluded that common law was initially created to protect property and
life from physical injury.' Warren and Brandeis then noted that as legal sys-
tems began to recognize the spiritual nature of human beings, the common law
expanded to include that protection of intangible possessions and non-physical
injuries through laws such as assault, nuisance, libel and slander.26
The authors recognized that new inventions and business methods of the age
were capable of recording or photographing the most private acts and then circu-
lating those images to every part of the community.27 In this regard Warren and
Brandeis criticized the press for making an industry out of gossip, which, in
earlier times, had simply been a hobby for the idle and the vicious.' The au-
thors contended that the "gossip industry" destroyed people's concern for things
of real importance to the community in an attempt to satisfy the prurient interest
of the public.29 Upon this basis, Warren and Brandeis examined the common
law to see if it afforded protection to those individuals "victimized" by new
technologies."0
In pursuing their research, the authors noted that "[t]he common law secure[d]
to each individual the right of determining, ordinarily, to what extent his
thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall be communicated to others."' By way
of analogy, they looked at the protection provided by common law copyright and
determined that private thoughts and actions were entitled to some similar protec-
tion.32 They also found that privacy rights had been recognized in both Eng-
land" and France.34 The authors then stated what they believed the law should
be; suggested the penalties for its violations; and outlined limitations to the
right.35
From the beginning, privacy owed its growth and development more to the
24. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 19, at 193.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 193-94.
27. Id. at 195.
28. Id.
29. Id. For a fuller exegesis on the media's gradual shift in focus towards the private lives of
famous people, see Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Pub-
licity Rights, 81 CAL. L. REv. 127 (1990). Explaining the rather late birth of the right of privacy,
Professor Madow notes that it was not until the twentieth century that commercial advertisers began
to exploit vigorously the images of famous individuals. See also Note, An Assessment of the Com-
mercial Exploitation Requirement as a Limit on the Rights of Publicity, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1703,
1713 (1983) ("[N]othing in our experience before the early 1900's... made such a right neces-
sary.")
30. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 19, at 197.
31. Id. at 198.
32. Id. at 200.
33. Id. at 208.
34. Id. at 214.
35. Id. at 214-20.
[Vol. V: I
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battle of legal scholars than to the courts.36 Indeed, after the article by Warren
and Brandeis, Herbert Spencer Hadley wrote an article, also entitled The Right to
Privacy, in which he attacked the doctrine set forth by Warren and Brandeis.37
Oddly, Hadley's article has received little of the fame of the Warren and Bran-
deis article, and is seldom cited, notwithstanding the fact that it provided almost
all of the arguments used by the early courts in opposing the development of the
privacy concept."
Hadley's thesis was that equity jurisdiction, as developed in the English com-
mon law system, is based upon the concept of property.39 That is, equity was
developed to prevent real and identifiable damage to tangible property.' With-
out such damage, or threatened damage, equity was powerless to act." Since
privacy dealt with mere feelings, it was a vaguely-defined, personal matter and
not a matter of property.42 Therefore, not only was there no equity jurisdiction,
but there was no rational basis for any jurisdiction.43
The foregoing criticism was echoed later by the highest courts in at least two
states." However, not all states rejected the privacy right. Rather, with Georgia
in the lead, the concept of privacy was soon adopted by other states around the
country and slowly became a part of many state's common law.45
Though state courts began to accept the right of privacy, the shaping of the
right was still left to legal scholars who attempted to define the limits of this
new legal concept. The next attempt at a broad based definition of privacy was
offered by Roscoe Pound.' Pound explained and then expanded the scope of
privacy by showing that it was part of the broader concept of personalty that
dated back to the Greeks and Romans.47
Pound attempted to construct a framework for understanding privacy which
36. Kessler, supra note 12, at 953; see also Kane, supra note 17, at 112-13.
37. Herbert Spencer Hadley, The Right of Privacy, 3 NEw ENG. L. REV. 1 (1894).






44. New York's Court of Appeals rejected the right in Roberson, 171 N.Y. 538 (1902), and was
followed later by Rhode Island which rejected the right in Henry v. Cherry, 73 A. 87 (R.I. 1909).
45. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905), became the lead case and was
nationally cited as authority for the principal that the right of privacy could be found in the common
law.
New York initially lead the way in upholding right of privacy cases. See Schuyler v. Curtis, 15
N.Y.S. 787 (Sup. Ct. 1891) (citing Manola v. Stevens, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 1890) (unreported)); Mac-
kenzie v. Soden Mineral Springs Co., 18 N.Y.S..240 (Sup. Ct. 1891); Marks v. Jaffa, 26
N.Y.S. 908 (Sup. Ct. 1893). See also Corliss v. E.W. Walker Co. 64 Fed. 280 (Mass. Cir. 1894).
Early cases accepting the principle were Kunz v. Allen, 172 P. 532 (Kan. 1918); Foster-Mil-
bum Co. v. Chinn, 120 S.W. 364 (Ky. Ct. App. 1909); Itzkovitch v. Whitaker, 39 So. 499 (La. Sup.
Ct. 1905); Munden v. Harris, 134 S.W. 1076 (Mo. Ct. App. 1911); Vanderbilt v. Mitchell 67 A. 97
(NJ. Sup. Ct. 1907); Edison v. Edison Polyform Co. 67 A. 392 (NJ. Ch. 1907).
46. Roscoe Pound, Interests of Personally, 28 HARV. L. REV. 343 (1915).
47. 1&
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would provide a foundation for subsequent judicial decisions.' This approach,
however, was not a great success. In the final analysis, Pound's attempt to equate
actual physical intrusion with an invasion of privacy proved far too esoteric and
philosophical to be of use in solving practical difficulties.' Pound's approach
also came dangerously close to the complaint raised by Hadley, that is, taking
vague concepts and transforming them into rights, which would so cloud the
concept of property that it would "banish from our laws that certainty and defi-
niteness on which are built the property rights of the people." For all of the
foregoing reasons, Professor Pound's article, though logically cogent and force-
ful, was seldom cited as a source during the development of the right to privacy.
The next major step in the analysis of the right to privacy came in 1960 with
William Prosser's Article entitled Privacy." Prior to this article, much of the
confusion between the right of privacy and publicity was due to the fact that,
conceptually, privacy had not developed beyond the general theory created by
Warren and Brandeis almost seventy years earlier.52 Specifically, almost no at-
tention had been paid to possible subcategories or classes that might have existed
within the right of privacy.53 All of this was changed by Prosser.
Prosser identified privacy as being composed of four separate groups of
rights: (1) intrusion, i.e. the unreasonable and offensive interference with the
solitude or seclusion of another, (2) public disclosure of private facts, i.e. the
publication of private, truthful information about another that gives offensive
publicity to this information;54 .(3) false light, i.e. the presentation of information
to the general public in such a manner as to convey a false and offensive impres-
sion of the individual;55 and (4) appropriation, i.e. the use of another person's
name or likeness for one's own benefit. 6
Here, in something of a backward step in the development of publicity, Pros-
ser held that publicity was merely a part of privacy. 7 Specifically, he stated that
publicity came under the heading of appropfiation." This categorization put
Prosser at odds with Melville Nimmer who, six years earlier, had written a major
article on publicity, classifying it as a totally separate right.5 9 In retrospect, it
seems as though Prosser did not totally disagree with Nimmer. For Prosser readi-
ly admitted that publicity was not only quite unlike the other three rights,' but
was also different from a pure case of appropriation.6 By way of illustration, a
48. Id. at 346.
49. Id. at 348.
50. Hadley, supra note 37, at 21.
51. Prosser, supra note 19, at 386-88.
52. Id. at 389-92.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 392-98.
55. Id. at 398.
56. Id. at 402.
57. Id. at 406-07.
58. Id.
59. Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBs. 203 (1954).
60. Prosser, supra note 19, at 406-07.
61. Id. Prosser states that "[ilt seems sufficiently evident that appropriation is quite a different
[Vol. V: 1
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normal case of appropriation might arise where a picture of an unknown person
is used in an advertisement without the person's knowledge or consent. Appro-
priation would be invoked if the picture had no inherent value in itself, and if the
unknown individual's privacy were damaged by the unwarranted public display.
The foregoing compares to a publicity case in which the scenario is the same,
except that the picture used is that of a well known person. In the later situation,
the picture has an independent value because the individual's personal fame
existed before its use in the advertisement.'
Notwithstanding his recognition that publicity was unique even as an act of
appropriation, Prosser did not want to become embroiled in the "property" versus
"feelings" debate regarding the interest which publicity protects. Specifically
Prosser stated that "[i]t seems quite pointless to dispute over whether such a
right is to be classified as property." 3 Instead, he took a neutral position as to
the essence of this entity since under his analysis, it was to be protected as prop-
erty anyway, i.e. "[The] interest protected is not so much a mental as a propri-
etary one." In the end, this helped very little in maturing the concept of a right
of publicity.
B. THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
The distinction that Prosser attempted to avoid is especially vital because
there is a major legal distinction between the way personal rights and property
rights are treated under the law. Personal rights are not transferable or descend-
ible upon death, whereas property rights are.65 That is, feelings exist, but their
value is to the person experiencing the feelings, all of which terminate upon
death.' On the other hand property, even intellectual property, has a discrete
existence and value that is separate from its owner67 and is subject to sale,
lease, or assignment, either by the owner while living, or by the owner's estate
after death.' In this case, publicity, is more like property than privacy in that it
is capable of existing separately from its owner and can potentially generate
income even after the celebrity has died.'
matter from intrusion, disclosure of private facts, or a false light in the public eye. The interest pro-
tected is not so much a mental as a proprietary one.. .. It seems quite pointless to dispute over
whether such a right is to be classified as 'property' (citation omitted). Its proprietary nature is
clearly indicated by a decision of the Second Circuit that an exclusive license has what has been
called a 'right of publicity."'
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. That is, if publicity is property, then it is different from privacy and is entitled to the same
protection as other property. On the other hand, if publicity is feeling, then it is a part of privacy and
an injury to it could only be redressed if the individual's privacy is violated.
65. J. Graham Matherne, Descendibility of Publicity Rights in Tennessee, 53 TENN. L. REV. 753,
762-63 (1986).
66. McCarthy, supra note 3.
67. Id.
68. Nimmer, supra note 59, at 209.
69. J. Steven Gingman, A Descendible Right of Publicity: Has the Time Finally Come for a Na-
1995]
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Thus, the debate concerning the nature of publicity is more than an academic
argument among legal scholars. The manner in which this issue is resolved can,
and will, have great economic impact on celebrities as well as their estates."
In the commentaries, publicity was first separated from the concept of privacy
and given its most definitive scholarly development by Professor Melville Nim-
mer in his article, The Right to Publicity.7' This article was published in 1954,
shortly after the term "publicity" was first used by a court to define the issues
before it.7 In arguing that publicity was a concept separate and distinct from
privacy, Nimmer showed the logical inconsistencies of trying to enforce a right
of publicity under a privacy statute.73 He noted that the concept of celebrity,
which means that the person is widely known by the general public, is not con-
sistent with the concept of privacy where it is used to protect a person unknown
to the general public from being unwarrantly placed in the public eye.74 The
traditional law of privacy, designed to insulate the individual from the scrutiny of
the general public, was not a mechanism to protect an individual who had inten-
tionally thrust himself before the public.' Under principles of privacy, one
could not shed the cloak of privacy and then bring a legal action because the
public knew about the person.' Indeed, according to Nimmer, in most cases ce-
lebrities do not want to be shielded from the public.7 They just do not want
their name or image to be used publicly for commercial purposes without their
consent and/or renumerationY'
Nimmer explained that the rigidity of privacy law failed to distinguish be-
tween these two classes of plaintiffs. The first is the traditional seeker of privacy,
one whose only desire is to lead a private life, free from unwanted interference
or probing.79 The second are those who put themselves in the spotlight for any
purpose including wealth or fame. 0 The later people are the ones with a need
to have their names and likenesses guarded from commercial exploitation."
Nimmer further reasoned that just as the Warren and Brandeis article devel-
oped privacy in response to modem newspaper practices which invaded personal
tional Standard? 17 PEPP. L. REv. 933 (1990). The Elvis Presley estate went from $4.9 million at
death to $75 million with gross income of $15 million per year aided in a large part to the sale of his
publicity rights. See Matherne, supra note 65, at 759-60, for an extended discussion of the public
policy reasons supporting descendibility of rights, including the belief that a person who creates
something of value should have the right to leave it to the objects of their bounty and not to commer-
cial exploiters.
70. Id.
71. Nimmer, supra note 59.
72. Haelan Lab., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953).
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areas of the individual's private life, new developments in media technology
required new rights to protect individuals from the wrongful use of their public
fame.8" Thus advanced media methods have created a new area of commercial
interest called publicity and this area should be afforded the same legal protec-
tion as any other item of commercial property. 3
Nimmer went on to consider other forms of possible redress for use in public-
ity cases, but found them to be lacking as well. Nimmer concluded that laws
against unfair competition, including the Lanham Act, which address unfair
competition would be inadequate in most cases because the plaintiff celebrity is
not typically in competition with the defendant.8" A claim for palming-off
would also be of no use in the majority of cases because the defendant would
have no interest in imputing that he or she is connected with the celebrity, that
is, the publicity value could be used without the necessity of claiming to be the
celebrity which is the basis for this remedy.8
Contract theory, on the other hand, would be inadequate because it would
only apply to parties to the contract,86 and most defendants would not be parties
to any contract with the celebrity.' Defamation would fail if a claim made
about a celebrity was truthful.8
Nimmer concluded his review of alternative remedies for protecting a celeb-
rity's image with the statement that "[t]he nature of the inadequacy of the tradi-
tional legal theories dictates in large measure the substance of the right of public-
ity."' Because of this, he held that publicity should be recognized as a proper-
ty, not a personal, right. This conclusion was based on the fact that publicity can
have great value and is achieved in many cases only after a person has "expend-
ed considerable time, effort, skill, and even money. It would seem to be a first
principle of Anglo-American jurisprudence... that every person is entitled to
the fruit of his labors .... 
II. A SELECTIVE LOOK AT STATE APPROACHES TO PUBLICITY RIGHTS
In order to better understand the uncertainty which the current state of publici-
ty law has created, not only for the celebrities, but for scholars and the courts,
this part examines four representative states, New York, California, Tennessee,
and Georgia, to see how the publicity right has been addressed or resolved.9 '
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 210-11.
85. Id. at 212-13.
86. Id. at 214-15.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 215.
89. Id. at 216.
90. Id. See Madow, supra note 29. But see White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., 989 F.2d
1512 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski J., dissenting).
91. By Professor McCarthy's account, the common law of fourteen states has not recognized the
existence of a right of publicity. Four of these states have enacted statutory provisions guaranteeing
9
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The courts of three of these jurisdictions with arguably the greatest possible
interest in a descendible right of publicity, i.e., New York,' California, and
Tennessee have, at various times, rejected the notion that publicity was a com-
mon law proposition.93
A. NEW YORK
Many states first defined and then accepted some concept of privacy as a right
before developing the concept of publicity.94 However, the State of New York
has taken a more convoluted path in this area than others as seen in the various
decisions of the New York courts on the subject.
The first reported case to deal with the subject of privacy was the 1891 case
of Schuyler v. Curtis.95 At issue was whether the right of publicity existed and
whether it was descendible. 6 Ultimately, the trial court, with little analysis, an-
swered both questions affirmatively.97
In Schuyler, a women's group planned to erect statues in the state of New
York of two women heroes of the time, Mrs. Schuyler, a well known philanthro-
pist, and Susan B. Anthony, a well known reformer, after first exhibiting the
statues at the Chicago World's Fair.98 Mrs. Schuyler's estate sued to enjoin the
project.' The defendants argued that to block this venture would lead to other
estates barring the erection of statutes to such individuals as Lincoln and
Washington."° The trial court, quoting liberally from the Warren and Brandeis
article,' ruled that Mrs. Schuyler was not a public figure but was a private
person who had always avoided publicity." The court indicated that she would
this right. Further, nine additional states, one of which is New York, have privacy statutes which may
be considered misnomers because they also protect the economic interests of celebrities in controlling
the use of their identities. See McCarthy, supra note 3, at § 6.6.1 [B].
92. Note from the following analysis that New York did not so much as deny the right altogether
so much as to hold that whatever right there may exist was preempted by statute.
93. See also Halpern, supra note 8, at 1234.
94. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905); see also Melvin v. Reid, 112
Cal. App. 285 (1931).
95. 15 N.Y.S. 787 (Sup. Ct. 1891). The right had also been upheld in the earlier unreported cases
of Manola v. Stevens, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1890); see also Mackenzie v. Soden Mineral Springs Co., 18
N.Y.S. 240 (Sup. Ct. 1891); Marks v. Jaffa, 26 N.Y.S. 908 (Super. Ct. 1893).
It appeared at this point that the right was secured in the State of New York.
96. Schuyler, 15 N.Y.S. at 788. Among the commentators, the question of descendibility of the
right of publicity continues to provide fertile ground for debate. Compare Andrew B. Sims, Right of
Publicity: Survivability Reconsidered, 49 FORDHAM L. REV. 453 (1981) (arguing for the continuance
of descendibility) with Todd F. Simon, Right of Publicity Reified: Fame as a Business Asset, 30
N.Y.L ScH. L. REv. 699 (1985) (opposing descendibility).
97. Schuyler, 15 N.Y.S. at 788.
98. Id. at 787.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 788.
101. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 19.
102. Schuyler, 15 N.Y.S. at 788-89.
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have had the right to block the erection of the statue were she still alive."3
This early decision did not consider whether a finding of privacy, which protects
one's feelings, could create a cause of action which survived death or could be
enforced by a third party. Instead, without further analysis, the court concluded
that this right passed to Schuyler's estate at her death.'
Three years later another trial court arrived at the opposite conclusion. In
Murray v. Gast Lithographic and Engraving Co., °5 a father sued the defendant
for injunctive relief and damages for the unauthorized publication of a picture
taken of his infant daughter.Y The photo had been taken for private family
reasons, but was somehow obtained by the defendant who displayed it
widely." In rejecting the plaintiff's claim, the court first addressed the issue
that was ignored in Schuyler that is whether one had standing to assert the priva-
cy right of another." The court held that the plaintiff could not assert his daug-
hter's right." In doing so, the court ignored the fact that not only was the
plaintiff a parent suing for the publication of private family pictures, but was
suing for a minor child for whom he had the right to bring a suit for any breach
of a duty under tort law. The court went on to hold that the purpose of law was
to protect the person and purse, but not feelings."0 It stated that in the case of
a moral wrong, it would be crude and indelicate to give money as compensa-
tion."'
In Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co.," a divided court decided one of
the most unpopular, though still influential, cases in New York privacy law."'
The court held that there was no remedy for a violation of privacy because no
such right existed in the common law of the state."4 Here, the defendant ob-
tained a private picture of the plaintiff and used it to produce 25,000 posters that
were circulated around the nation to advertise defendant's baking flour."5 The
court held that, rather than sue, the plaintiff should be flattered that the defendant
thought her pretty enough to have her picture placed on posters which were hung
throughout the country."6 It then refused to recognize that a right of privacy
existed in the common law, and denied recovery."'
103. Id.
104. 1& One also feels that the conservative family would have been mortified to see their ancestor
within a mile of the radical Anthony, even in death.





110. Id. at 271.
111. Id. at 272.
112. 171 N.Y. 538 (1902).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 556.
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This decision so outraged public opinion that in defense, one of the Justices
who signed the majority opinion, wrote a law review article to justify the deci-
sion."' Justice Denis O'Brien argued that the court's decision had been misun-
derstood."9 He began his article with a page and a half of quotes from the
newspaper attacking the decision.' O'Brien then digressed to a discussion of
the Dred Scott case, which he defended as another misunderstood but proper
decision.' He rejected the notion that the plaintiff has a property right in her
image which could be protected by the court,'" and because he found that
there was no property involved, he concluded that her prayer for an injunction
could not succeed. Furthermore, because the plaintiff did not sue for damages,
Justice O'Brien concluded that no other remedy was possible and that there were
no criminal sanctions for such activities."z Additionally, he stated that an in-
junction was not proper since the defendant had already made and distributed the
posters."' Finally, the Justice said that the press was responsible for killing an
earlier bill which would have applied in such a situation, and that it was up to
the legislature to develop such a right."
The justice concluded by stating that it would have been coarse and degrading
to apply to a woman's beauty the same rules applicable to chattels and land.2 6
"The right of privacy in such cases, if it exists at all, is something that can not
be regulated by law."'2 7 This case ruling on the common law has not been over-
turned and haunts New York law today.
The legislative reaction was swift. In response to the outrage described by
Justice O'Brien in his article,": the legislature, at the next session, passed a
law that was narrowly based upon the facts of Roberson, and the remedies sug-
gested by O'Brien in his article.'29 The statute provided for damages, injunctive
relief, and criminal penalties for the unauthorized use of a person's name, pic-
ture, or image for advertising or trade purposes.'" As this law was specifically
drafted to fit the facts of Roberson which was a privacy case, the elements of
publicity were not a consideration. However, later courts, as we shall see, used
this statute to give relief to individuals whose claims were essentially based upon
publicity claims.
118. Denis O'Brien, The Right of Privacy, 2 COLUM. L. REv. 437 (1902).
119. Id. at 438.
120. Id. at 437-38.
121. Id. at 438-39.
122. Id. at 439.
123. Id. at 441-42.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 444-45.
126. Id. at 439.
127. Id. at 444.
128. Id. at 437-38. See N.Y. Crv. RIGHTS LAw §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1992) (right of privacy de-
signed to protect the right to control the commercial value of one's name or image for purposes of
advertising or trade).
129. O'Brien, supra note 118, at 437-38.
130. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1992 & Supp. 1994).
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One of the first cases tried under this structure was Binns v. VitaGraph.
Here the plaintiff was a telegraph operator on a ship that became involved in a
wreck on the high seas.' Binns telegraphed for help, and became the first per-
son to use the "wireless" in such an emergency and in the process, saved hun-
dreds of lives.'33 Vitagraph studio, one of the leading silent movie companies
of the day, not only made a movie about his involvement in this incident, but
went on to make a series of movies using his character in other fictitious adven-
tures.34 The court, in ruling for the plaintiff, held that his name and likeness,
represented by an actor, were used without his permission for business in viola-
tion of the statute and awarded him damages.'
The Binns holding was followed in Loftus v. Greenwich Lithographing
Co., 3 which in essence was a right of publicity case decided under privacy
law. 37 In Loftus, the defendant created a poster based upon the picture of a
particular "Ziegfeld Girl" who was a well-known entertainer.' The poster was
published in a number of magazines. 39 The court noted that the "rose" outfit
worn by the character in the poster was so unique to the plaintiff that all who
saw the picture thought that it was she."4 The court held that the publication
constituted a use of the plaintiff's image and was a violation of her privacy
under the statute. 4' The contradiction between holding a public celebrity to be
a private person in a matter of their public life was not addressed in Loftus. Thus
began a judicial practice in the state which looked to the privacy statute to re-
solve matters that were based upon publicity.
Building upon certain constitutional restrictions first outlined by Warren and
Brandeis, 42 New York recognized some fundamental limitations to the enforce-
ment of the privacy right. In Booth v. Curtis Publishing Co.,'43 the court ruled
131. 103 N.E. 1108 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1913).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. Though the plaintiff alleged that the pictures subjected him to public ridicule, the court
deemed this assertion to be immaterial because the cause of action was not for libel. Because the
claim was brought under the Civil Rights Law, the plaintiff needed only to show that this image was
used without his permission for commercial purposes to prove his claim.
135. Id. at 1101.
136. 182 N.Y.S. 428 (App. Div. 1920).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 429-30.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 431-32.
142. That is, if the individual was one for whom there was a legitimate public interest, and if
because of this interest, articles, movies or books were written about that person based upon real or
fictional events, the work may be allowed under the first amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion. This public character of the individual's actions was recognized as early as the Warren article
which analyzed the details of such an exception. See Warren and Brandeis, supra note 19, at 214.
143. 223 N.Y.S.2d 737 (App. Div. 1962), affd, 182 N.E.2d 812 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1962); see also
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that the first amendment right of freedom of the press limited the right of priva-
cy where the plaintiff appeared in a picture taken and used as part of a valid
news story." The plaintiff, a well known actress, was photographed at a sum-
mer resort as part of a news story about that resort which was to run in the de-
fendant's Holiday magazine. "5 Subsequently, a portion of the article with the
plaintiff's picture was used in a series of advertisements in the defendant's mag-
azine as well as in several other periodicals.'" The plaintiff sued on grounds
that she never gave permission to have her photo used in advertisements in the
defendant's publication. She alleged that this was a violation of the New York
statute.
47
The New York Court of Appeals rejected the defendant's argument that the
plaintiff did not have a right of privacy." However, the court found that this
right did not protect her from a true and fair representation in the news' 49 and
that her photo was not used as an endorsement of the product." Again as in
Lofius, the right of publicity was not explicitly raised even though the plaintiff
was a well known figure and her image was used as a sales tool of the defen-
dant. The New York court thus continued to adhere to the principle called a
privacy interest, a doctrine less familiar than that of publicity.
In Schumann v. Lowe's Inc.," the plaintiffs, four great grandchildren of the
famous classical music composer Robert Schumann, sued the defendant for dam-
ages and injunctive relief because of a motion picture about the composer which
indicated that insanity ran in the family.'52 The court found that the privacy
right could only be enforced by the living for their own protection. 3 More-
over, the Court held that, even if privacy was property which could descend to
heirs, the plaintiffs did not show that they were the direct heirs of the de-
ceased.54 The court also noted that it had not been shown that the composer's
privacy rights had not been assigned by earlier heirs to someone else.'55 Be-
144. Booth, 223 N.Y.S.2d 737.
145. Id. at 740-41.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 745.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 744. See also Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). Here a
movie based upon the life of Agatha Christie was allowed; see also Frosh v. Grosset, 427
N.Y.S.2d 828 (App. Div. 1980). In this case, the plaintiff was the estate of Marilyn Monroe which
sued Norman Mailer over a book about the deceased. In both cases the claims were denied on the
grounds of freedom of expression. Compare Wojtowicx v. Delacorte Press, 374 N.E.2d 129 (N.Y. Ct.
App. 1978) (ruling that while the plaintiff believed that the supposedly fictitious books and movies
were about them, there was no relief as their name, portrait or picture was not used as required by
statute).
151. 135 N.Y.2d 361, 369 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
152. Id.
153. Id. at 366.
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cause of these obstacles, the Court dismissed the suit.'56
As time and technology progressed, as increasingly large number of New
York celebrities found themselves suing under the privacy statute to recover for
right of publicity violations. This was because the legal fiction of using privacy
laws to resolve publicity cases had become a celebrity's only recourse. The use
of this fiction was promoted by the New York legislature's refusal to pass a
formal law creating a right of publicity.'57
However, this fiction was not always followed and some later courts refused
to enforce a claim where the individual was considered to be a public figure. In
Miller v. Madison Square Garden Corp., the plaintiff, Bronco Charlie, a well
known entertainer, found that his picture had been used on the program for the
six day bicycle races.'58 The plaintiff sued to collect the estimated promotional
value for the use of his image, but the jury found that there was nothing humili-
ating about the use of this picture and that he was already well known to the
public, and therefore there was no substantial injury to his privacy.'59 The jury
proceeded to award the plaintiff nominal damages of six cents."W
In Gautier v. Pro-Football, Inc., the plaintiff, an animal trainer who per-
formed during halftime at a professional football game, sued because television
showed parts of his act though his contract specifically forbade such a show-
ing.6 ' The court ruled that he was not covered under the statute because he
could hardly claim that his right of privacy was infringed as he agreed to per-
form before 35,000 people. 62 The difficulties which arose in those cases was
because the right of privacy statute was designed to guard only those who had
voluntarily put themselves before the public. In cases such as Gautier, plaintiffs
confronted a statute which offered little remedy against commercial exploiters.
A positive advance in the development in the law was made when the right of
publicity was named, defined, and assigned an independent existence in Haelan
156. Id.
157. Kessler, supra note 12, at 975-76.
Two bills died in the New York legislature in 1994 alone. Assembly Bill 681 died in the Gov-
ernment Operations Committee. Senate Bill 3469 died in the Senate Codes Committee. However, four
bills have currently been filed for 1995. Assembly Bill 3194 is pending in the Government Opera-
tions Committee. Assembly Bill 3661 also pending in the Government Operations Committee. Senate
Bill 155 is pending in the Senate Codes Committee. Senate Bill 2316 is also pending in the Senate
Codes Committee.
158. 28 N.Y.S.2d 811 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. 107 N.E.2d 485, 489 (N.Y. 1952).
162. Id.; see also Man v. Warner Bros. Inc., 317 F. Supp. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). The court held that
the plaintiff, shown in the movie Woodstock, had no privacy claim as he agreed to play before
400,000 people. But see Brinkley v. Casablancas 438 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (App. Div. 1981). Here a model
agreed to allow photos of herself to be shot for a poster. She later performed on television in the
same outfit and poses of the poster. She sued the poster company and won injunctive relief under the
privacy statute, because the pose used, though almost identical to those of the television show, was
not specifically the one approved by the plaintiff.
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Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.,63 a landmark decision by the
Second Circuit.'" In Haelan, the court was asked to interpret the New York
privacy statute so as to determine the right of a baseball player to sell his image
to two separate baseball card companies." After entering into a contract with
one baseball card company, the player later entered into a contract with
another.'" The first company, Haelan Laboratories, sued the second company,
Topps Chewing Gum, for inducing a breach of contract. 67 Topps defended on
the grounds that they had committed no actionable wrong. They held that the
contract between the ballplayer and the plaintiff was no more than a release of
liability as required by the statute, since without a release, the ballplayer could
have sued the plaintiff if they had publicly used his photo.'" The defendant
further argued that under the statute, the right of privacy was personal, and thus
was not assignable.'" Therefore, the plaintiff could not use Topps because it
was impossible for the plaintiff to own or to enforce the player's right of priva-
cy. 7
0
Recognizing the potential for absurd results under the defendant's interpreta-
tion of the New York right to privacy law, the federal court held that the state
law recognized that an individual had another common law interest in addition to
his statutory right of privacy:
We think that, in addition to and independent of that right of privacy (which in
New York derives from statute), a man has a right in the publicity value of his
photograph, i.e., the right to grant the exclusive privilege of publishing his
picture, and that such a grant may validly be made "in gross," i.e., without an
accompanying transfer of a business or of anything else. Whether it be labelled
a "property" right is immaterial; for here, as often elsewhere, the tag "property"
simply symbolizes the fact that courts enforce a claim which has pecuniary
worth... This right might be called a "right of publicity." .. .
The court distinguished publicity from the statutory right of privacy which it
held could only be measured by its effect on the feelings of its owner and there-
fore could not be enforced by anyone else, since it was not felt by anyone
else.77 The Haelan court concluded that it could and would enforce a claim for
a violation of publicity rights.173
The Haelan rule, that the right of publicity was enforceable, was followed in
Price v. Roach.' Price not only held that each member of the comedy team of
163. 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953).
164. Id. at 868.
165. Id. at 867.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. (citing N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1992)).
169. Id.
170. Id. at 868.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 868.
173. Id.
174. Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); see also Southeast Bank,
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Laurel and Hardy had a right of publicity in his name and image, but also that
this right was descendible.'75 The rule was expanded in a case involving the
Marx brothers which held that, in addition to a right of publicity in their own
image, they had also a right in any character that they created.'7 6 Indeed, from
this point, the courts went on to protect celebrities not only from those who
would trade on their image or picture, but also from individuals who looked
like'" or sounded like' a famous person.
Despite the excellent reasoning of the Haelan decision and its widespread
usage as a reference source of the right of publicity, the New York state courts,
subsequently in the case of Stephano v. News Group Publication, Inc.,'79 de-
nied the existence of an independent common-law right of publicity and stead-
fastly maintained that all remedies must be sought under the statutory right to
privacy.'" Here, a model had his picture taken as part of a paid photo session.
Later, one of the photos was used as part of a magazine article on clothing styles
and prices without the plaintiff's permission. The publisher claimed that the
photo was not used for trade or advertising purposed but was instead used to
illustrate a newsworthy fashion event of trend.'8 ' The court ruled that this was
news and came under the newsworthy exception which had been established in
the Booth case to protect newspapers, books and movies.' The plaintiff was
thus denied recovery.
In its reasoning, the New York Court of Appeals denied that the plaintiff
could plead a right of publicity in New York outside the privacy statute.' 3 The
court reasoned that the statute applied to any use of a person's picture or portrait
for advertising or trade purposes when the defendant has not obtained the per-
N.A. v. Lawrence, 483 N.Y.S.2d 218 (App. Div. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 489 N.E.2d 744
(N.Y. 1985).
175. Price, 400 F. Supp. at 844.
176. Groucho Marx Prods., Inc. v. Day and Night Co., 523 F. Supp. 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev'd
on other grounds, 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982). Contra Lombardo v. Doyle, Dane & Bembach, Inc.,
396 N.Y.S.2d 661 (App. Div. 1977). This rule protecting any unique character developed by the star,
was not extended to an individual's familiar gestures or style.
But, note that other states have gone much farther. See Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toi-
lets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983) where the court expanded publicity rights to include a phrase
made popular by the plaintiff- Motschenbacher v. RJ. Reynolds, 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974) where
the right was expanded to include objects which clearly identified the plaintiff.
But see Booth v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 362 F. Supp. 343 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). Actress Shirley
Booth, again suing for the use of her image, sued the defendant because they used a cartoon charac-
ter, which was also the basis for the character in her television show, in a commercial. The court held
here that she had no rights in a copyrighted character created by someone else.
177. Onassis v. Christian Dior-New York, 472 N.Y.S.2d 254 (Sup. Ct. 1984); see also Allen v.
National Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). Here the court would have allowed a look-
alike to be used when the advertisement clearly identified the lookalike an impersonator.
178. Lahr v. Adell Chem. Co., 300 F.2d 256 (1st Cir. 1962).
179. 474 N.E.2d 580 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1984).
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 586.
183. Id. at 584.
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son's consent to do so.14 It stated that
"Since the 'right of publicity' is encompassed under the Civil Rights Law as an
aspect of the right of privacy, which, as noted, is exclusively statutory in this
State, the plaintiff cannot claim an independent common-law right of publici-
ty."1
85
This ruling which negates the existence of an independent right of publicity
leaves this area of law for the state of New York in a nebulous condition.
B. CALIFORNIA
The law of privacy and publicity in California developed along smoother, if
not more rational, lines. The first case to bring the question of the right of priva-
cy before the California Court was Melvin v. Reid 6 or the case of the "red
kimono." The court here avoided the controversy caused in New York with its
Roberson decision. Indeed, the court appeared to go out of its way to uphold
privacy in a case in which the facts would suggest that this right plainly was not
applicable.' 7
As a young prostitute, the plaintiff had been charged with murder and was
acquitted in a highly publicized trial. Seven years later, after she had reformed
herself and married well, a movie was made about the incident which included
the use of her maiden name. 8 Citing the Warren article,'89 the court did not
consider the fact that the case had been a matter of public record; that it had
been decided only seven years earlier and was within the memory of most
adults; and that it had been a highly publicized and newsworthy event. Instead of
weighing those factors, the Melvin court concluded that the right of privacy ex-
isted in California and ruled that the publication of these facts was a violation of
the plaintiff's rights.'O
Later, in Fairfield v. American Photo Copy Co., 9' another California court
held that the plaintiff's right of privacy was violated. Here the defendant used
the plaintiff's name on a list of satisfied copy machine customers when in fact,
the plaintiff had not been satisfied and had returned his machine." The appel-
late court found that the trial court erred when it did not allow the plaintiff to
show that his right of privacy had been violated. 3 Specifically, the trial court
had prohibited the plaintiff from testifying that, as an attorney, his feelings had
been injured when other attorneys saw the advertisement and called to inquire
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. 291 P. 91 (Cal. 1931).
187. Id.
188. Id. at 92.
189. Id. at 92-93.
190. Id. at 96.
191. 291 P.2d 194 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1955).
192. Id. at 196.
193. Id. at 200.
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about the use of his name in the advertisement, or called to ridicule him. 94
In Gill v. Curtis,)" the California Supreme Court held that a magazine
which published a picture of a couple taken in a public place, violated their
privacy when the picture was linked to an article on promiscuous sex."9 The
picture showed a young couple sitting on stools in an ice cream parlor."9 The
man's arm was around the young woman as the couple sat cheek to cheek.'98
Under the picture was a caption that said "Publicized as glamorous, desirable,
'love at first sight' is a bad risk."' 99 The accompanying article said that such
attraction was 100% sexual, that it was wrong, and that marriage based upon
such an attraction would end in divorce.' °
In reality, the couple was a well known married couple who owned the ice
cream parlor and was photographed in their own place of business."' The pic-
ture was taken and published without their permission, and the accompanying
article has absolutely nothing to do with them.2° In addressing the defendants
argument that the publication was protected by the first amendment's freedom of
the press argument, the court held that while the first amendment was an impor-
tant consideration, it had to be balanced against the rights of the plaintiffs. 20 3
Here, the court found that there was no need to present any picture at all with
the article since it added nothing to the information being given."' On the
other hand, the court concluded that real damage was done to the plaintiffs in
having been portrayed in this manner.2 5 The court held that the law favored
the plaintiffs in this case because there was evidence that their feelings were
genuinely injured and, therefore, the plaintiffs were entitled to damages."° Iron-
ically, the plaintiffs never alleged that their right of privacy had been violated,
but the court found that the facts alleged by the plaintiffs were sufficient to
establish such a violation.0 7
One year after Gill v. Curtis, the same couple was again in court with an
identical claim against another publication in Gill v. Hearst Pub. Co. .' How-
ever, in this case, the court placed a limit on how far it would go in balancing
privacy against first amendment privileges, and began an initial discussion of the
194. Id.






201. Id. at 631.
202. Id. at 631-32.
203. Id. at 633-34.
204. Id. at 634.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 635-36.
207. Id.
208. 253 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1953).
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right of publicity.2° Here, the photograph at issue in Gill v. Curtis was repub-
lished by another magazine.l Again, the Gills did not know that it was to be
published in the defendant's magazine.21 It was printed without story or com-
ment as an example of this well known couple's affection for each other.212
Here the court ruled that the press had the freedom to run a non-shocking picture
of the plaintiffs as part of the public's interest in them as celebrities."' Unlike
the previous case, the court did not find the picture to be associated with an
uncomplimentary article which held them up to ridicule.214 Further, the court
ruled that there could be no privacy in actions which are made public 5 The
court found that the couple was hugging in public, even though this was their
place of business, and this could be photographed and reproduced for anyone to
see who had an interest in this couple as celebrities. 6 Hence, the court ruled
that they were not entitled to damages.217
The California courts spoke to celebrities again in Cohen v. Marx.218 Here,
the court said that by voluntarily entering the public domain through a trade or
profession, celebrities are exposing themselves to jibes and negative com-
ments." 9 The court recognized that the first amendment allowed jokes and
comments to be made about public figures, and that such statements would not
be prohibited by the right of privacy laws.n °
In James v. Screen Gems, Inc.," the court limited the use of privacy rights
to its owner. The plaintiff, widow of Jesse James, Jr. sued the defendant for what
she deemed an inaccurate movie about her deceased husband.m Specifically,
she asserted that the movie cast him in an unfavorable light because of his infa-
mous father.m She further claimed that this caused her to become the target of
harassment and abuse. 4
Here the elements of a right to publicity were mingled with the elements of
209. Id.
210. Id. at 444.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 442.
213. Id. at 442-43.
214. Id. at 445.
215. Id. at 444 (citing Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91, 93 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1953)).
216. Id.
217. Id. Under the First Amendment, it is this privilege of the press to photograph and publish
pictures of celebrities in public, which has led to the pursuit of celebrities by photographers now
associated with scandal sheet newspapers; See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433
U.S. 562 (1977); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967); see also New York Times v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1964).
218. 211 P.2d 320, 321 (Cal. C. App. 1949). In Cohen, Groucho Marx told a joke about one of
the well known boxers of the day.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. 344 P.2d 799 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
222. Id. at 799-800.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 800.
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the right of privacy. However, as the right of publicity had not been developed in
the state, the plaintiff styled it as one of privacy.' The court held that one
cannot assert the privacy rights of another and ruled against her." 6 The court
found that the plaintiff was not mentioned in the movie, and therefore had no
standing to bring a cause of action because her privacy had not been
invaded. 7
Under the developing law at the time, it might have been argued that her
husband was a celebrity and any commercial value in his name belonged to him
and became hers through heirship. This argument would give her a cause of
action even though she was not mentioned in the work. However, she would still
have had to overcome a first amendment problem if the court found that her
husband was a newsworthy or historical subject.
California first addressed the issue of publicity in Lugosi v. Universal Pic-
tures. The plaintiffs were the widow and son of movie actor Bela Lugosi.-
, They sued the movie company for which Lugosi worked, to prevent it from
selling and marketing Count Dracula products made popular by the actor.'
The court of appeals in reversing a judgment for the plaintiff in the trial court,
found that the right of publicity existed, but then proceeded to develop a bad rule
of descendibility which was then used to deny the plaintiffs' judgment' That
is, the court looked at whether the deceased had marketed his image while alive
and found that he had not 2 The court then ruled that if the right was not ex-
ercised during the life of the celebrity, then it did not survive death and could
not be descendible." 3 This rule with its limitations was followed in the Rud-
olph Valentino case. 4
The court chose to follow Prosser in holding that it was pointless to decide
whether the right was personal or property. 5 In blurring this distinction, the
court made the exercise of the right, rather than its value, the test in these cases.
A better test would have been to determine if the name or image had financial
value at death?' Any such value would then be property of the heirs.
In California, the common law development of the right of privacy and the
right of publicity proceeded along a much more orderly line than in New York.
The Califomia courts in the cases analyzed above firmly asserted the existence
of the right of privacy and subsequently recognized a limited existence of the
225. Id. at 801.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. 603 P.2d 425 (Cal. 1979).
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 430-31.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Gugliemi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prod., 603 P.2d 454 (Cal. 1979).
235. Lugosi, 603 P.2d at 430-31.
236. Id. at 434. Note that the dissent in this case gives one of the best judicial analysis of the right
ever and is the direction that subsequent California statutes seemed to follow.
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right of publicity. The clear distinction between the two rights emerged when it
became obvious that the issues presented in some cases had more to do with
individuals profiting from use of celebrity images for commercial reasons than in
the exposure of private citizens to unwanted and unwarranted public attention.
Unfortunately, however, the foregoing cases created another problem. By
allowing an heir to inherit and utilize the right of publicity as property only if
exercised during the life of the celebrity, the courts created an unreasonable
distinction between two classes of heirs. No such rule applies to any other type
of property and is akin to holding that a child could only inherit a car from a
parent if the parent had driven that car during his or her lifetime."?
To resolve the problem of descendibility in the area of the right of publicity,
the California legislature in 1984 passed a law specifically aimed at curing the
problems created by the court opinions which had allowed the right to descend
only when exercised during the celebrity's life and which in essence codifies the
dissent in Lugosi.ns This statute defined and codified the elements of publicity,
that is, a personality's name, voice, signature, photograph, and likeness.s It
declared them to be property and transferable.2" It also allows descendants the
right to inherit and own the right of publicity for fifty (50) years after the death
of the celebrity.24 This later provision accomplishes two things. It gives the
descendants of the celebrity an opportunity to benefit from the commercial value
of their ancestor's image. Then it allows the community to erect statues and
engage in other uses which societies have traditionally done in honor of past
celebrities and heroes.242 California also provides by statute, criminal sanctions
for violation of these rights.243 This law is simple and well crafted and compli-
ments the rulings of the California court.
C. TENNESSEE
While many states have reached the issue of publicity by first working
through the legal concept of privacy, Tennessee case law skipped privacy law
development altogether. Instead, Tennessee moved straight to the consideration
of the right of publicity. As with New York, the initial rulings of the court at
both the state and federal level gave contradictory rulings as to the right's exis-
tence and inheritability.
237. This is to be distinguished from other intellectual properties which are covered by patent and
trademarks. For in these cases, unless the property is registered for the world to see, there may be no
way to know who created the work and thus there may be no proof upon which the heirs could even
connect themselves to be property so as to make a claim. However, if a person such as Elvis Presley
creates an image known the world over, no one could fail to connect that image to his daughter Lisa
Marie.
238. CAL. Civ. CODE § 990(b), (c), (h) (West 1993).
239. § 990 (b), (c), (h).
240. § 990 (b), (c), (I).
241. § 990 (a).
242. § 990 (h).
243. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.
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Memphis Development Foundation v. Factors Etc., Inc.,2" the first of the
many Elvis Presley cases, was also the first Tennessee case to deal with the
question of a celebrity's right to his or her own image.245 Prior to Memphis De-
velopment, there were no reported cases in Tennessee concerning either privacy
or publicity.2" Nonetheless, Tennessee did seem to accept the privacy rule as a
given, especially in publicity cases.247
In Memphis Development, a non-profit organization, Memphis Development
Foundation, (hereinafter "Foundation") planned to erect a statue of Elvis Presley
in Memphis, Tennessee.2" In order to raise the necessary funds for this statue,
the organization planned to sell miniature statues of Elvis.249 To secure the
rights to engage in this project, the Foundation sued Factors Etc., an organization
which had contracted with the Presley estate for the exclusive right to market
and use the publicity rights of the deceased entertainer which included his name,
picture, and image. In response, Factors counterclaimed for an injunction
against any use of the deceased's name or image."
In a well reasoned decision, the United States District Court, held that the
right of privacy and the right of publicity existed and that they were descend-
ible."2 The court then enjoined the Foundation from any use of the Presley im-
age without permission from FactorsY3
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit's summary opinion equated publicity to reputa-
tion which is a privacy, rather than a property concept."4 On that basis, it re-
244. 441 F. Supp. 1323 (W.D. Tenn. 1977) rev'd on appeal, 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir. 1980).
245. Id. A line of "Factors" cases decided by New York district courts attempted though incorrect-
ly to interpret Tennessee law which added nothing to the study of publicity but bewilderment. See
Memphis Dey. Foundation v. Factors, 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir. 1980) [hereinafter "Memphis Develop-
ment IPI; Factors Etc., Inc. v. Creative Card Co., 444 F. Supp. 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Lancaster v.
Factors, 9 Media L. Rep. 1109 (Tenn. Ch. 1982); Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 652 F.2d 278
(2d Cir. 1981); Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc. 701 F.2d 11 (2d Cir. 1983); Factors Etc., Inc. v.
Pro Arts, Inc., 496 F. Supp. 1090 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 541 F. Supp.
231 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
246. Memphis Dev., 441 F. Supp. at 1325.
247. See also Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).
In Tennessee the right to privacy cases had been developed as subsidiary findings, if not dic-
tum in other cases. A good example of this is seen in the Davis case. At issue in this case was what
to do with seven frozen pre-embryos. The Tennessee Supreme Court considered ethics, contract law,
bailment, and domestic law as possible sources for the solution to this problem. Without any prelimi-
nary analysis or even mention, the court unexpectedly announced that the right of privacy of both
parties had to be considered and weighed so as to determine who should prevail.
Ultimately, the court found that the ex-wife did not want the pre-embryos for her own use but
for donation purposes. In such a case, the ex-husband's privacy interest in not being involuntarily
made a parent outweighed the ex-wife's interest and the court gave judgment to him.
248. Memphis Dev., 441 F. Supp. at 1324.
249. Id. at 1325.
250. Id. at 1324-25.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 1330.
253. Id. at 1331.
254. Memphis Development II, 616 F.2d 956, 959 (6th Cir. 1980).
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versed the district court's decision and held that while there was a right of pub-
licity in Tennessee, it was a personal right and therefore was not inheritable or
devisable."3
At the state level, the decisions on publicity were equally in conflict. In one
of two relevant chancery court rulings, Commerce Union Bank v. Coors' held
that the right of publicity existed.z" In Coors, a beer company as part of a col-
lage of images of Tennessee lifestyles, used the likeness of country music great
Lester Flatt on a poster." In rejecting the defendant's motion to dismiss, the
court exhibited an understanding of the conceptual problems before it by defining
and then distinguishing the difference between privacy and publicity. 9 The
court then decided that the right of publicity existed in Tennessee, that it was
property, and therefore survived death and was descendible.2W As part of its
analysis, the court found that the deceased had entered into a contract to sell his
image while alive through a series of ads and promotions for the Martha White
Flour company."
However, in another of the Elvis disputes, Lancaster v. Factors, a different
chancery court ruled in a summary opinion that the right of publicity was not
descendible.262 Here the court traced the source of the right of the Factors com-
pany to market Presley's right of publicity.263 It found that when Presley was
alive, he had executed an exclusive contract for the use of his image to Boxcar
Enterprises.2" Upon his death, Boxcar transferred these rights to Factors. The
plaintiff, who had initially contracted with Factors and paid all proper fees, then
sued for recision of the contract on the grounds that the right was not descend-
ible and therefore there was no consideration on the part of the defendant.2s
The only issue before the court was whether the right was descendible.2 The
court, concerned with problems such as how long the right would last after
death, and how this would affect news reports, ruled that the right was not
descendible.267
With the Tennessee trial courts issuing contradictory decisions, the Tennessee
Court of Appeals attempted to resolve the conflict. In deciding the appeal from
the Commerce Union Bank v. Coors,2" the court confused privacy and publici-
ty. In a muddled analysis, the Court of Appeals reversed the better reasoned
255. Id. at 960. But see Elvis Presley Enters. v. Elvisly Yours, Inc., 936 F.2d 889 (6th Cir. 1991).
256. 7 Med. L. Rptr. (BNA) (Tenn. Ch. Ct. 1981).
257. Id.
258. Id. at 2205.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 2205-06.
261. Id.
262. Lancaster v. Factors, 9 Med. L. Rptr. (BNA) 1109 (1982).





268. 9 Tenn. Atty. Memo 32-1 (1984).
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chancery court decision and held that the right of publicity did not survive death
in Tennessee.2
After this case, Tennessee passed the Protection of Personal Rights Statute
which gave every individual a property right in the use of their name, photo-
graph, or likeness in any medium and in any manner" The statute made the
right descendible, allowed the right to be freely assigned and licensed27" ' and al-
lowed a minimum of ten years after the death for the heirs or estate to exercise
or capitalize upon their right before it entered the public domain.' Further, the
statute prohibited others froh commercially using this right without the permis-
sion of the individual or their estate.273
Subsequently, in another Elvis case, the Tennessee Court of Appeals partially
reversed the ruling of Coors and criticized the Sixth Circuit's decision in Fac-
tors, holding that the right of publicity did exist in the common law of the
state.274 This decision, in addition to the statute, provides the same treatment to
the right of publicity as that given to other forms of intangible property in Ten-
nessee and gives the law the same basic structure as that of California.
D. GEORGIA
In Pavesich v. New England Life Ins.,2" Georgia, through its Supreme Court
was the first state to recognize a common law right to privacy. This case has
become the landmark in support of the principle that the right existed in common
law.7 Pavesich was decided a year after the New York courts rejected the
right in Roberson. Not only did the court analyze and define the right of privacy,
but it gave an early and insightful analysis into the nature of publicity.2"
The court outlined the distinctions between the two concepts and held that
different rules would apply to an individual, who is a private citizen than to one
known in the public forum.7 In Pavesich, the plaintiff's picture, taken by a
photographer for private purposes, was used without permission as part of a
newspaper advertisement for the defendant's insurance company 9 After not-
ing that the plaintiff was a private citizen and not a public figure, the court re-
viewed the short history of the right of privacy and strongly criticized the Rober-
269. Id.
270. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-25-1101 to 47-25-1108 (1984).
271. § 47-25-1103.
272. § 47-25-1104.
273. § 47-25-1105. The heirs have the sole right to use the publicity rights during the first ten
years following death. After this initial period, there is a two year grace period during which the
estate can still claim the right by using it, if it is not then being used by someone else. If used by the
heirs during this period, the right appears to belong permanently to the estate. If not, the right enters
the public domain.
274. State ex reL Elvis Presley v. Crowell, 733 S.W.2d 89, 95 (Tenn. App. 1987).




279. Id. at 68-69.
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son decision.28 It held that the right of privacy existed as part of the Georgia
common law.2"'
Later, in Bazemore v. Savannah Hospital, 2 the court granted a limited ex-
tension of the right of privacy to third parties. 3 Here, the plaintiff's child was
born with its heart outside its body.284 After an unsuccessful operation, the in-
fant died.28" The hospital then permitted a photographer to take a picture of the
nude body which was subsequently sold to the local press which ran the sto-
ry. 6 The court rejected the defendant's argument that the right to privacy was
personal and belonged to the child and therefore expired upon its death.' In-
stead, the court held that the right of privacy in question was that of the
parents.2 8 It found that the cause of action had not occurred during the life of
the child, but had only arisen upon the child's death2 9 The injured parties in
this case were the parents.2 "
The Georgia courts as early as Pavesich were able to distinguish the different
interest and rights involved in private matters and in the unauthorized use of
celebrity images. In Cabaniss v. Hipsley,29 ' Georgia became one of the first
states to recognize, by common law, the existence of a right of publicity. In this
case, a strip tease dancer sent a picture to her agent to publicize an appearance in
Atlanta.2 The defendant magazine was accused of improperly obtaining the
picture and publishing an ad for several weeks saying that the plaintiff would
appear at another club in which she had no connection.29 The case was sub-
mitted to the jury as a violation of the plaintiff's right of privacy.294 The jury
found for the plaintiff and the defendants appealed.29
In reviewing the case, the Georgia Court of Appeals closely analyzed the
nature of the right of privacy' and reversed that part of the lower court deci-
sion based upon an invasion of privacy.297 It found that the plaintiff was a ce-
lebrity and that the photograph was not a private picture but was in fact a public-
ity shot made for the public.298 The court held that under these facts, one could
280. Id. at 77.
281. Id. at 79.
282. 155 S.E. 194 (Ga. 1930).
283. Id.
284. Id. at 195.
285. ld.
286. Id.




291. 151 S.E.2d 496 (Ga. Ct. App. 1966).
292. Id. at 498-99.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 499-500.
295. Id.
296. Id.
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not make a claim under the right of publicity2 9
The Georgia Court of Appeals reaffirmed this foregoing principal in McQueen
v. Wilson.' The court, in a case involving as actress, made famous in the
movie "Gone with the Wind," ruled that the right of publicity was a property
right."' Here the plaintiff allowed pictures and a taped movie to be made with
the condition that they were not to be used commercially without the plaintiff's
permission.0' Later, a third party obtained the materials and made postcards,
movies and a souvenir booklet featuring the plaintiff without her permission and
without payment.' The court rejected the plaintiff's privacy claim.' but
ruled that she did have a right to market her own image and that she had a prop-
erty right in her image.' 5 Note, however, that although this court described the
principle in detail, it did not use the term "right of publicity" although the term
had been used in the earlier Cabaniss case.'
In Martin Luther King Jr. v. American Heritage Products,"0 the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals was asked to decide a Georgia case that involved the
use of the image of Martin Luther King.' Rather than rule on the question of
publicity rights under Georgia law, this federal court certified the relevant
questions to the Georgia Supreme Court so the federal decision would be based
upon the ultimate state law.' Three questions were certified to the Georgia
Supreme Court: [1] does the right of publicity exist as a right independent of the
right of privacy; [2] does the right survive the death of the owner, and [3] does
the right have to be exploited during life to be descendible?310 In response, the
Georgia Supreme Court held [1] that publicity was a discrete right separate from
privacy, [2] that it was descendible, [3] and that it did not have to be exploited
during life to descend."' The Georgia decision was then incorporated and made
the decision of the Eleventh Circuit."'
In King the plaintiff brought suit to stop the defendant from selling unlicensed
busts of the deceased civil rights leader."3 The defendant argued that King's
right to his image terminated upon death. 4 After considering the development
of the right of publicity in the state, the Georgia court restated its earlier position
299. Id.
300. 161 S.E.2d 63 (Ga. CL App.), rev'd on other grounds, 162 S.E.2d 313 (Ga.), vacated, 162
S.E.2d 704 (Ga. Ct. App. 1968).
301. Id. at 66.
302. Id. at 64-65.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 65.
305. Id. at 66.
306. Cabaniss v. Hipsley, 151 S.E.2d 496, 506-07 (Ga. CL App. 1966).






313. Id. at 675.
314. Id. at 676.
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on the issue and held that the right of publicity existed in Georgia."3 5 The court
defined the right as property and therefore descendible.3 6 Further, the court
noted that, as property, there was no need for the right to have been exploited
during the life of the deceased in order to survive." 7
In five cases, and without the aid of statutes at both the state and federal
level, Georgia managed to avoid all of the complexity of New York, and much
of the prestatutory confusion of Tennessee and California. Indeed on the issues
of privacy, and then publicity, Georgia was the first state to find a common law
basis for the existence of these rights."' As a result, the Georgia Courts have
been the most enlightening example for other states in their discussion of these
issues.
CONCLUSION
The right of publicity is a relatively new concept and, as such, it is still trying
to find its own identity in the law and in the courts. Publicity rights were born
out of the right of privacy, and the state of Georgia seems to be one of the few
states that has smoothly incorporated broad rights in both interests into its law.
Tennessee and California represent states that have done so aided by statutes." 9
Surprisingly, while New York was the first state to identify and analyze the
right of privacy, and then to identify and distinguish the right of publicity, the
state only provides publicity the narrowly defined protection of the privacy stat-
ute which was established in response to the facts of the Roberson case. As a
result publicity has developed in a tentative manner, because it does not have a
separated existence from the right of privacy.32
The history of publicity rights further reflects the types of problems which
celebrities, and especially their estates, may encounter in attempting to protect
and utilize their right of publicity in many of the other states which have yet to
formally recognize publicity rights. In a society dominated by mass media, pub-
licity can no longer be described as a local issue. Today's media not only creates
nationally known celebrities, but creates a national market for celebrity imag-
315. Id. at 679.
316. Id. at 682.
317. Id. at 683.
318. Note that Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953), which first identified and applied the concept of the right of pub-
licity, was a federal case, ostensively interpreting New York law. However, New York's highest court
subsequently rejected this decision as not the state law. Oddly then, the greatest landmark case in the
area of publicity law is not authority in the state in which it was decided. See infra note 320.
319. Thirteen states have so far enacted publicity statutes. See Appendix B.
320. Stephano v. News Group Publications, 474 N.E.2d 580 (N.Y. 1984) (rejecting a separate
common law right of publicity and declaring publicity to be an aspect of the right of privacy statute).
These cases were superseded by Stephano: Gautier v. Pro-Football, 107 N.E.2d 485 (N.Y.
1952); Namath v. Sports Illustrated, 371 N.Y.S.2d 10 (App. Div. 1975); Booth v. Curtis Publishing,
223 N.Y.S.2D 737 (App. Div.), affd, 182 N.E.2d 812 (N.Y. 1962); Miller v. Madison Square Gar-
den, 28 N.Y.S.2d 811 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
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321
Yet even more statutory clarification at the state level, leaves numerous legal
hazards which may hamper the proper utilization of this market by celebrities or
their estates. The Schumann3" case referred to earlier is an excellent example
of the problems possible in attempting to enforce a cause of action for a viola-
tion of a state right of publicity in an interstate system where each state, not only
has the right to regulate the use of this property, but has the right to decide if the
property actually exists which is unique to this type of property.3"
In Schumann the plaintiffs plead sixty one causes of action for each of the
states, the District of Columbia, other countries of the Americas and one each for
the other continents. One should note that this case, though brought under priva-
cy rights, involved the publicity right of composer Robert Schumann.324 The
New York court then had to refer to the common law of the state of Connecticut
which was found to be the governing law in this case.3" It then concluded that
the Connecticut common law was the same as New York's since, New York's
common law did not recognize the right of privacy as a result of the Roberson
case, the court then ruled that the rights did not exist in the common law of
Connecticut.3 26 The court then identified sixteen states whose law was identical
to the law of Connecticut and then dismissed claims for the same reasons.327
In thirty other states and the British Isles, the New York court found that the
rights only applied to living persons and therefore were not inheritable.3" In
the remaining states where the right existed and was inheritable, the court held
that the plaintiffs could not show that they were direct heirs of the deceased, nor
that the composer's privacy rights had not been assigned by earlier heirs to
someone else.329
The Schumann court also held that the plaintiffs did not prove a cause of
action under the laws of Canada, Mexico, Central America, the West Indies,
Europe, Japan, Asia, Africa, and Australia.3" The court rejected the claims for
all common law nations for the same reasons it rejected the claims of all com-
mon law states, i.e. that it would be the same as New York which did not recog-
nize the claim.33" ' In theory, some variation of this complicated method would
have to be used anytime a celebrity wished to attempt to enforce nationally their
right of publicity with the results likely to change from state to state depending
upon whether its common law recognized the right or based it upon privacy.332
321. See Madow, supra note 14.
322. Schumann v. Lowes, 135 N.Y.S.2d 361, 369 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1954).





328. Id. at 366-67.
329. Id. at 368-69.
330. Id.
331. Id. at 365-66.
332. This would not appear to be a problem as the law of the state where the celebrity was domi-
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In light of all this, this paper proposes that Congress pass a law to protect this
property as it has done for intellectual properties. It has become almost a ritual
of modem America to propose a federal statute under the interstate commerce
clause333 for every conceivable social, political, or personal problem, even
when that problem is not a legitimate area of interstate commerce. The area of
publicity rights, however, is a legitimate area for interstate federal regulation.
The value created in a person's image is as real as any property, good will,
copyright or trademark, and should be entitled to the same level of protection
without requiring the owner to go through the complicated process indicated in
the Schumann case.334
Any such law would not have to be a complicated or elaborate matter.335
ciled should control. Here, New York interpreted the Connecticut law in a manner which denied the
claim. However, under the same facts, Connecticut or anyone of the other common law states or
countries could have decided contra. Also, courts have sometimes misinterpreted the law of the do-
micile. See Factors Etc., Inc. v. ProArts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215, 221 (2nd Cir. 1978), which found that
publicity rights existed in the State of Tennessee at a time in which it did not.
333. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8.
334. See, e.g., Douglass v. Hustler Magazine Inc., 769 F.2d 1128, 1138 (7th Cir. 1985) ("the right
to prevent others from using one's name or picture for commercial purposes without consent"); Mc-
Carthy, supra note 3, at vii ("the inherent right of every human being to control the use of his or her
identity"); Nimmer, supra note 59, at 216 ("the right of each person to control and profit from the
publicity values which he has created or purchased").
335. Model Publicity Statute
1. Purpose- The purpose of this statute is to protect the interest in the commercial value which
a natural person may have created in their name, image, picture, voice, character or any likeness in
the interstate commerce of this nation.
2. Right of Publicity- Any natural person who has established in their name, image, picture,
voice or character a fame or noteworthiness as a result of their activity, profession or occupation that
is more than local in nature, shall have the exclusive right to license, assign or devise this fame
which shall be termed a right of publicity.
3. Property Right- every individual shall have a property right in their right of publicity. This
right shall be transferrable, assignable, and descendible. It will not be necessary that this right be
exercised during the life of its owner to preserve descent.
4. Unauthorized Use- No person shall have the right to use the right of publicity of another
without the expressed consent of that person or their designated representative or heir.
5. Remedies- Any party injured by a violation of this right shall be entitled to compensatory
damages, exemplary damages, and injunctive relief.
6. Duration of Right- No action shall be brought under this section for the use of a deceased
person's right of publicity after the expiration of 50 years from the death of the deceased.
7. Exemptions-
(A) It shall not be a violation of this statute to use the image of a person in connection with
any news, public affair, or historical account unless the use is so consistent as to appear to be an
endorsement or it is proven that the use of the person's name, photograph, or other likeness was so
directly connected with the commercial sponsorship as to constitute an unauthorized use.
(B) It shall not be a violation of this statute if the use is part of a reasonable advertisement of
a newspaper, news program, media activity, or historical account, unless the use is so consistent as to
appear to be an endorsement or it is proven that the use of the person's name, photograph, or other
likeness was so directly connected with the commercial sponsorship as to constitute an unauthorized
use.
(C) Nothing in this section shall apply to the owners or employees of any medium used for
advertising, including but not limited to newspapers, magazines, radio and television stations, bill-
[Vol. V: I
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The statute would merely have to declare [1] that the value of an individual's
name, image, picture, or character is property and a subject of interstate com-
merce; [2] that it is assignable and inheritable; [3] that it cannot be used without
the permission of the owner, assigns or heirs and [4] that there be placed upon it
some time limit on its usage before it is allowed to become a part of the public
domain.
The right of publicity in a media age can be property of immense value. After
a hundred years of haphazard, confused, and in some states, no development at
all of this important new property concept, a federal statute would resolve this
particular problem of interstate commerce.
By the way, I have been told by a source who has seen the King lately that
he does not want privacy as that would eliminate his estate's right to profit from
his image. He prefers the publicity.
APPENDIX A
Chart of State PrivacylPublicity Laws
1. Alabama336
Privacy Law- established by common law, descendibility unknown. Publicity Law-
no statute or case to indicate if the right of publicity exists.
2. Alaska
Privacy Law- no statute and no case law to indicate if the right exists. Public-
ity Law- no statute and no case law to indicate if the right of publicity exists.
3. Arizona337
Privacy Law- established by common law; right is not descendible. Publicity Law-
established by common law; right is not descendible.
boards, and transit ads, who have published or disseminated any advertisement or solicitation in vio-
lation of this part, unless it is established that such owners or employees had knowledge of the unau-
thorized use of the person's name, photograph or other likeness as prohibited by this statute.
336. Smith v. Doss, 37 So. 2d 118 (Ala. 1948) (noting that common law right of privacy exists).
337. Cluff v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 460 P.2d 666 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1969) (noting that common law
right of privacy exists); Reed v. Real Detective Publishing Co., 162 P.2d 133 (Ariz. 1945) (holding
that the right of privacy is "a creation of modem common law" but is not descendible because the
right is a personal right and not a property right); Sinider v. Goldsmith, 623 F. Supp. 727 (D.C. Ariz.
1985). Arizona recognizes the right of publicity. The right is not descendible.
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4. Arkansas33
Privacy Law- established by common law; descendibility unknown. Publicity Law-
no statute or case law to indicate if the right of publicity exists.
5. California3.
Privacy Law- established by common law; established by statute. Publicity
Law- established by common law; established by statute; right is descendible.
6. Colorado
Privacy Law- no statute and no case law to indicate if the right exists. Public-
ity Law- no statute or case law to indicate if the right of publicity exists.
7. Connecticut"
Privacy Law- established by common law; descendibility unknown. Publicity Law-
no statute or case law to indicate if the right of publicity exists.
8. Delaware4'
Privacy Law- established by common law; descendibility unknown. Publicity Law-
no statute or case law to indicate if the right of publicity exists.
9. District of Columbia342
Privacy Law- established by common law; descendibility unknown. Publicity Law-
no statute or case law to indicate if the right of publicity exists.
10. Florida
3 43
Privacy Law- established by common law; established by statute; right is
descendible. Publicity Law- established by statute; right is descendible.
338. Olan Mills v. Dodd, 353 S.W.2d 22 (Ark. 1962); Dunlap v. McCarty, 678 S.W.2d 361 (Ark.
1984) (noting that common law right of privacy exists).
339. Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91 (Cal. Ct. App. 1931) (noting that common law right of privacy
exists). The privacy law statute supplements case law. The publicity law statute supersedes case law.
340. Kom v. Rennison, 156 A.2d 476 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1959) (noting that common law right of
privacy exists).
341. Barbieri v. News-Journal Co., 189 A.2d 773 (Del. 1963) (noting that common law right of
privacy exists).
342. Peay v. Curtis Publishing Co., 78 F. Supp. 305 (D.D.C. 1948); Vassiliades v. Garfinckel's,
492 A.2d 580 (D.C. 1985) (noting that common law right of privacy exists).
343. Cason v. Baskin, 20 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 1944) (noting that common law right of privacy exists).
The privacy statute supplements case law. The publicity statute supersedes case law.
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Privacy Law- established by common law; right is descendible. Publicity Law-
established by common law; right is descendible.
12. Hawaii45
Privacy Law- established by common law; descendibility unknown. Publicity Law-
no statute or case law to indicate if the right of publicity exists.
13. Idaho346
Privacy Law- established by common law; descendibility unknown. Publicity
Law- no statute or case law to indicate if the right of publicity exists.
14. Illinois47
Privacy Law- established by common law; right is not descendible. Publicity
Law- established by common law; descendibility unknown.
15. Indiana34
Privacy Law- established by common law; descendibility unknown. Publicity Law-
no statute or case law to indicate if the right of publicity exists.
16. Iowa3
49
Privacy Law- established by common law; right is descendible. Publicity Law-
no statute or case law to indicate if the right of publicity exists.
344. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905) (noting that common law right
of privacy exists); Bazemore v. Savannah Hosp., 155 S.E. 194 (Ga. 1930) (recognizing that the right
is descendible); Martin Luther King, Jr. Center for Social Change v. American Heritage Prods., 694
F.2d 674 (1 1th Cir. 1983). Georgia recognizes the right of publicity. It also holds the right is des-
cendible.
345. Fergerstrom v. Hawaiian Ocean View Estates, 441 P.2d 141 (Haw. 1968) (noting that com-
mon law right of privacy exists).
346. Baker v. Burlington N., Inc., 587 P.2d 829 (Idaho 1978) (noting that common law right of
privacy exists).
347. Eick v. Perk Dog Food Co., 106 N.E.2d 742 (1ii. App. Ct. 1952) (noting that common law
right of privacy exists); Maritote v. Desilu Prods., Inc., 345 F.2d 418 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 883 (1965) (recognizing that the right is not descendible); Winterland Concessions Co. v. Sileo,
528 F. Supp. 1201 (N.D. ill. 1981). Illinois recognizes the right of publicity. The right is transferable.
348. Patton v. Jacobs, 78 N.E.2d 789 (Ind. App. 1948) (noting that common law right of privacy
exists).
349. Bremmer v. Journal-Tribune Publishing Co., 76 N.W.2d 762 (Iowa 1956) (noting that com-
mon law right of privacy exists). This case also appears to provide for limited descendibility, though
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17. Kansas35
Privacy Law- established by common law; descendibility unknown. Publicity
Law- no statute or case law to indicate if the right of publicity exists.
18. Kentucky"5 '
Privacy Law- established by common law; established by statute; right is
descendible. Publicity Law- established by statute; right is descendible.
19. Louisiana352
Privacy Law- established by common law; descendibility unknown. Publicity Law-
no statute or case law to indicate if the right of publicity exists.
20. Maine353
Privacy Law- established by common law; right is not descendible. Publicity Law-
established by common law; descendibility unknown.
21. Maryland354
Privacy Law- established by common law; descendibility unknown. Publicity Law-
no statute or case law to indicate if the right of publicity exists.
22. Massachusetts
3 5
Privacy Law- established by statute; right is not descendible. Publicity Law-
established by statute; descendibility unknown.
23. Michigan356
350. Kunz v. Allen, 172 P. 532 (Kan. 1918); Rinsley v. Frydman, 559 P.2d 334 (Kan. 1977) (not-
ing that common law right of privacy exists).
351. Foster-Milburn Co. v. Chinn, 120 S.W. 364 (Ky. 1909) (noting that common law right of
privacy exists). The statute supplements case law.
352. Itzkovitch v. Whitaker, 39 So. 499 (La. 1905), Souder v. Pendleton Detectives, Inc., 88 So.
2d 716 (La. Ct. App. 1956) (noting that common law right of privacy exists).
353. Estate of Berthiaume v. Pratt, 365 A.2d 792, 794 (Me. 1976) (noting that common law right
of privacy exists and is descendible under statute; right of publicity recognized); Nelson v. Maine
Times, 373 A.2d 1221 (Me. 1977) (noting that right of privacy is purely personal and thus the action
is limited to the living person directly involved).
354. Beane v. McMullen, 291 A.2d 37, 44 (Md. 1972) (noting that common law right of privacy
exists).
355. The Massachusetts statute protects the right of privacy called appropriation that is the per-
son's name, portrait or picture. This does provide some limited protection of publicity rights, but it is
yet to be seen if this will be interpreted as complete recognition of the right of publicity.
356. Pallas v. Crowley, Milner & Co., 33 N.W.2d 911, 913 (Mich. 1948) (noting that common law
right of privacy exists); Fry v. Ionia Sentinel-Standard, 300 N.W.2d 687 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980) (rec-
ognizing that the right is not descendible).
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Privacy Law- established by common law; right is not descendible. Publicity
Law- no statute or case law to indicate if the right of publicity exists.
24. Minnesotd3 "
Privacy Law- rejects the right. Publicity Law- established by common law.
25. Mississippi3 s
Privacy Law- established by common law, descendibility unknown. Publicity Law-
no statute or case law to indicate if the right of publicity exists.
26. Missouri359
Privacy Law- established by common law; descendibility unknown. Publicity Law-
no statute or case law to indicate if the right of publicity exists.
27. Montana
Privacy Law- established by common law; descendibility unknown. Publicity Law-
no statute or case law to indicate if the right of publicity exists.
28. Nebraska
3 61
Privacy Law- established by statute; right is descendible. Publicity Law- es-
tablished by statute; right is descendible.
29. Nevada
6 2
Privacy Law- established by statute; right is descendible. Publicity Law- es-
tablished by statute; right is descendible.
357. Markgraf v. Douglas Corp., 468 N.W.2d 80, 83 (Minn. 1991). The Minnesota courts have
specifically rejected a common law right of privacy and no statute provides for such a right. Uhlaen-
der v. Hendricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277 (D. Minn. 1970). Minnesota recognizes the right of publicity.
358. Young v. Jackson, 572 So. 2d 378 (Miss. 1990) (noting that common law right of privacy
exists).
359. Munden v. Harris, 134 S.W. 1076 (Mo. Ct. App. 1911) (noting that common law right of
privacy exists).
360. Sistok v. Northwestern Tel. Sys., Inc., 615 P.2d 176, 182 (Mont. 1980) (noting that common
law right of privacy exists).
361. Statute supersedes case law. The Nebraska statutes protects the right of privacy called appro-
priation, that is the person's name, portrait or picture. This does provide some limited protection of
publicity rights, but it is yet to be seen if this will be interpreted as complete recognition of the right
of publicity.
362. Though the Nevada statute specifically refers to the right of publicity, it defines it in such a
manner as to include appropriation which is a privacy right. It does this by protecting all natural
persons which would include non-celebrities.
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30. New Hampshire
Privacy Law- no statute and no case law to indicate if the right exists. Public-
ity Law- no statute or case law to indicate if the right of publicity exists.
31. New Jersey363
Privacy Law- established by common law; descendibility unknown. Publicity Law-
no statute or case law to indicate if the right of publicity exists.
32. New Mexico
364
Privacy Law- established by common law; right is not descendible. Publicity Law-
no statute or case law to indicate if the right of publicity exists.
33. New York"
Privacy Law- established by statute; descendibility unknown. Publicity Law-
established by statute; descendibility unknown.
34. North Carolina'
Privacy Law- established by common law; descendibility unknown. Publicity Law-
no statute or case law to indicate if the right of publicity exists.
35. North Dakota
Privacy Law- no statute and no case law to indicate if the right exists. Public-
ity Law- no statute or case law to indicate if the right of publicity exists.
36. Ohio367
363. Vanderbilt v. Mitchell, 67 A. 97 (NJ. 1907), Frey v. Dixon, 58 A.2d 86 (NJ. Ch. 1948)
(noting that common law right of privacy exists); The Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339
(D.NJ. 1981). New Jersey recognizes the right of publicity. It also holds that the right is descendible.
364. Blount v. T D Publishing Corp., 423 P.2d 421 (N.M. 1966) (noting that common law right of
privacy exists); Bitsie v. Walston, 515 P.2d 659 (N.M. Ct. App.) (recognizing that the right is not
descendible).
365. Statute supersedes case law. The New York statute protects the right of privacy called appro-
priation, that is the person's name, portrait or picture. This does provide some limited protection of
publicity rights, but it is yet to be seen if this will be interpreted as complete recognition of the right
of publicity.
366. Brown v. Boney, 255 S.E.2d 784 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979) (noting that common law right of
privacy exists).
367. Young v. That Was the Week that Was, 423 F.2d 265 (6th Cir. 1970) (A common law right
of privacy exists in Ohio. However, this case rules that the right does not survive.); Zacchini v. Scr-
ipps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 351 N.E.2d 454 (Ohio 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 433 U.S. 562
(1977). Ohio recognizes that a right of publicity exists. However, this case rules that the right is
personal and not property and therefore does not survive. See also Reeves v. United Artist, 572 F.
Supp. 1231 (N.D. Ohio 1983).
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Privacy Law- established by common law; right is not descendible. Publicity
Law- established by common law; right is not descendible.
37. Oklahoma
Privacy Law- established by common law; established by statute; right is
descendible. Publicity Law- established by statute; right is descendible.
38. Oregon'
Privacy Law- established by common law; descendibility unknown. Publicity Law-
established by common law; descendibility unknown.
39. Pennsylvania37
Privacy Law- established by common law; descendibility unknown. Publicity Law-
no statute or case law to indicate if the right of publicity exists.
40. Rhode Island37'
Privacy Law- established by statute; descendibility unknown. Publicity Law-
no statute or case law to indicate if the right of publicity exists.
41. South Carolina3
Privacy Law- established by common law; descendibility unknown. Publicity Law-
no statute or case law to indicate if the right of publicity exists.
42. South Dakota373
Privacy Law- established by common law; descendibility unknown. Publicity
Law- no statute or case law to indicate if the right of publicity exists.
368. Munley v. ISC Fin. Hounse Inc., 584 P.2d 1336 (Okla. 1978) (noting that common law right
of privacy exists). Here, the privacy statute supplements the case law. The publicity statute super-
sedes the case law.
369. McLain v. Boise Cascade Corp., 533 P.2d 343 (Or. 1975) (noting that common law right of
privacy exists); Anderson v. Fisher Broadcasting Co., 712 P.2d 803 (Or. 1986) (Oregon recognizes
the right of publicity).
370. Marks v. Bell Tel. Co., 331 A.2d 424, 430 (Pa. 1975) (noting that common law right of pri-
vacy exists). Aquino v. Bulletin Co., 154 A.2d 422 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1959).
371. Statute supersedes case law.
372. Meetze v. Associated Press, 95 S.E.2d 606 (S.C. 1956) (noting that common law right of
privacy exists).
373. Truxes v. KenCo Enter., 119 N.W.2d 914 (S.D. 1963) (noting that common law right of
privacy exists).
37
Moore: Regulating Publicity: Does Elvis Want Privacy
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
DEPAUL J. ART & ENT. LAW
43. Tennessee3"4
Privacy Law- established by common law; established by statute; right is




Privacy Law- established by common law; established by statute; right is
descendible. Publicity Law- established by statute; right is descendible.
45. Utah
376
Privacy Law- established by common law; established by statute; descendi-
bility unknown. Publicity Law- established by statute; descendibility unknown.
46. Vermont3"
Privacy Law- established by common law; descendibility unknown. Publicity Law-
no statute or case law to indicate if the right of publicity exists.
47. Virginia378
Privacy Law- established by statute; right is not descendible. Publicity Law-
established by statute; descendibility unknown.
48. Washington379
Privacy Law- established by common law; descendibility unknown. Publicity Law-
no statute or case law to indicate if the right of publicity exists.
374. State ex rel., Elvis Presley v. Cromwell, 733 S.W.2d 89 (Tenn. 1987) (noting that common
law right of privacy exists). Privacy statute supplements case law. Publicity statute supersedes case
law.
375. Billings v. Atkinson, 489 S.W.2d 858 (Tex. 1973); National Bonding Agency v. Demeson,
648 S.W.2d 748 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983) (noting that common law right of privacy exists); National
Bank of Commerce v. Shaldee, 503 F. Supp. 533 (W.D. Tex. 1980) (recognizing that the right is de-
scendible). Statute supplements case law.
376. Donahue v. Warner Bros. Picture Distrib. Corp., 272 P.2d 177 (Utah 1953) (noting that com-
mon law right of privacy exists). Privacy statute supplements case law. Publicity statute supersedes
case law.
377. Staruski v. Continental Telephone Co., 581 A.2d 266 (Vt. 1990) (noting that common law
right of privacy exists).
378. Statute supersedes case law.
379. Lewis v. Physicians & Dentist Credit Bureau, 177 P.2d 896 (Wash. 1947) (noting that com-
mon law right of privacy exists).
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Privacy Law- established by common law; descendibility unknown. Publicity Law-
no statute or case law to indicate if the right of publicity exists.
50. Wisconsin
Privacy Law- established by statute; right is not descendible."' Publicity
Law"'- established by common law; descendibility unknown.
51. Wyoming
Privacy Law- no statute and no case law to indicate if the right exists. Public-
ity Law- no statute or case law to indicate if the right of publicity exists.
APPENDIX B
Current State Statutes with Some Major Features
1. California383
Privacy- yes; Publicity- yes; Assignable- there is a provision for assignability;
Descendible- there is a provision for descendibility; Limitation period for the ex-
clusive use of rights after death by the heirs or assign- 50 years; Remedies-
actual damages, exemplary damages, minimum damages, attorney fees, costs.
Florida
38 4
Privacy- yes; Publicity- yes; Assignable- there is a provision for assignability;
Descendible- there is a provision for descendibility; Limitation period for the ex-
clusive use of rights after death by the heirs or assign- 40 years; Remedies-
actual damages, exemplary damages, injunctive relief.
380. Roach v. Harper, 105 S.E.2d 564 (W. Va. 1958) (noting that common law right of privacy
exists).
381. Statute supersedes case law. In § 895.50(a)(b), Wisconsin specifically states that it is to pro-
tect the name, portrait, or picture of living persons.
382. Hirch v. S.C. Johnson and Son, 280 N.W.2d 129 (Wis. 1979) (Wisconsin recognizes the right
of publicity).
383. CAL. CIV. CODE § 990 (West 1982). This statute was specifically drafted to make publicity
and privacy rights descendible. The state common law protects both rights of the living, while pro-
viding only limited descendibility for certain publicity rights.
384. F.A. STAT. ANN. § 540.08 (West 1988).
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Kentucky"
Privacy- yes; Publicity- yes; Assignable- there is a provision for assignability;
Descendible- there is a provision for descendibility; Limitation period for the ex-
clusive use of rights after death by the heirs or assign- 50 years; Remedies-
actual damages, exemplary damages, minimum damages, attorney fees, costs.
Massachusetts386
Privacy- yes; Publicity- yes; Assignable- there is no provision for assignabili-
ty; Descendible- there is no provision for descendibility; Limitation period for
the exclusive use of rights after death by the heirs or assign- none; Remedies-
actual damages, treble damages.
Nebraska
387
Privacy- yes; Publicity- no ..; Assignable- there is a provision for assignabil-
ity..; Descendible- there is a provision for descendibility; Limitation period for
the exclusive use of rights after death by the heirs or assign- none; Remedies-
actual damages.
Nevada"
Privacy- yes; Publicity- yes; Assignable- there is a provision for assignability;
Descendible- there is a provision for descendibility; Limitation period for the ex-
clusive use of rights after death by the heirs or assign- 50 years; Remedies-
actual damages, exemplary damages, minimum damages, injunctive relief.
New York9'
Privacy- yes; Publicity- no; Assignable- there is no provision for assignability;
Descendible- there is no provision for descendibility; Limitation period for the
385. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.170 (Michie/Robbs-Merrill 1984). This statute may create a bit
of confusion in that it is styled to protect public figures, however in section (1) it gives every person
without distinction a property right in their own name and likeness. However, in section (2) it specifi-
cally refers to public figures in granting a fifty (50) year use period after the person's death.
386. MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 214 § 3A (Law Co-op. 1986).
387. NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 20-201 to 20-211 (1943).
388. While the statute refers only to the right of privacy, § 20-202 does protect the individual from
appropriation which has often been used as a substitute for the right of publicity.
389. Privacy rights in general are denied descendibility, however, in § 20-208, the area of privacy
known as appropriation and which is often used as a substitute for publicity rights are exempted from
this general denial and are deemed to survive death.
390. NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 598.980 - 598.988 (Michie 1986). This is a publicity statute. How-
ever, in § 598.982 it gives the protection to any living person regardless of their status as celebrities
which in effect protects the individuals right of privacy known as appropriation.
391. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50 - 51 (Consol. 1992). The New York statute specifically refers
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exclusive use of rights after death by the heirs or assign- none; Remedies- actual
damages, exemplary damages, injunctive relief, criminal sanctions.
Oklahoma"
Privacy- yes; Publicity- no393; Assignable- there is a provision for assignabil-
ity; Descendible- there is a provision for descendibility; Limitation period for the
exclusive use of rights after death by the heirs or assign- none; Remedies- actual
damages, injunctive relief, punitive damages, criminal sanctions.
Rhode Island394
Privacy- yes; Publicity- yes3 .; Assignable- there is no provision for assign-
ability; Descendible- there is no provision for descendibility; Limitation period
for the exclusive use of rights after death by the heirs or assign- none;
Remedies- actual damages, attorneys fees, injunctive relief, treble damages.
Tennessee3"
Privacy- yes; Publicity- yes; Assignable- there is a provision for assignability;
Descendible- there is a provision for descendibility; Limitation period for the ex-
clusive use of rights after death by the heirs or assign- no limit if used within 12
years; Remedies- actual damages, injunctive relief.
Texas3
97
Privacy- yes; Publicity- yes; Assignable- there is a provision for assignability;
Descendible- there is a provision for descendibility; Limitation period for the ex-
clusive use of rights after death by the heirs or assign- 50 years; Remedies-
actual damages, exemplary damages, minimum damages, attorney fees, costs.
Utah398
Privacy- yes; Publicity- yes; Assignable- there is no provision for assignabili-
ty; Descendible- there is no provision for descendibility; Limitation period for
the exclusive use of rights after death by the heirs or assign- none; Remedies-
actual damages, exemplary damages, injunctive relief, attorney fees, costs.
392. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21 § 839 (West 1983).
393. While the statute refers only to the right of privacy, § 839.1 does protect the individual from
appropriation which has often been used as a substitute for the right of publicity.
394. 1980 R. I. PUB. LAws 9-1-28.
395. While the statute refers only to the right of privacy, § 9-1-28.1(a)(2) does protect the indi-
vidual from appropriation which has often been used as a substitute for the right of publicity.
396. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25 (1988).
397. TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 26 (West 1985).
398. UTAH CODE ANN. § 45-3 (1988). This is a very limited statute which covers generally the
right of privacy and publicity, but limits the scope of this statute to cases in which the use of the per-
son, their name or likeness constitutes an endorsement of some subject matter.
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Virginia399
Privacy- yes; Publicity- yes; Assignable- there is a provision for assignability;
Descendible- there is a provision for descendibility; Limitation period for the ex-
clusive use of rights after death by the heirs or assign- 20 years; Remedies-
actual damages, exemplary damages, injunctive relief, criminal sanctions.
Wisconsin'
Privacy- yes; Publicity- no; Assignable- there is no provision for, assignability;
Descendible- there is no provision for descendibility; Limitation period for the
exclusive use of rights after death by the heirs or assign- none; Remedies- actual
damages, exemplary damages, injunctive relief, attorney fees, costs.
399. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-40 (Michie 1986).
400. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 895.50 (West 1983). The Wisconsin statute limits relief to living persons.
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